

Not used

Exhibit A - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine, 24 June 1946.

"Anau Statement"

"Unofficial Statement by the Japanese Foreign Office
April 17, 1934.

"The following is an English translation unofficially issued by the Japanese Foreign Office of the unofficial statement issued by the Foreign Office on April 17, 1934, known as the 'Anau Statement':

"Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China, may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations: but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.

"Japan has been compelled to withdraw from the League of Nations because of their failure to agree in their opinions on the fundamental principles of preserving peace in East Asia. Although Japan's attitude toward China may at times differ from that of foreign countries, such difference cannot be evaded, owing to Japan's position and mission.

"It goes without saying that Japan at all times is endeavoring to maintain and promote her friendly relations with foreign nations, but at the same time we consider it only natural that, to keep peace and order in East Asia, we must even act alone on our own responsibility and it is our duty to perform it. At the same time, there is no country but China which is in a position to share with Japan the responsibility for the maintenance of peace in East Asia. Accordingly, unification of China, preservation of her territorial integrity, as well as restoration of order in that country, are most ardently desired by Japan. History shows that these can be attained through no other means than awakening and the voluntary efforts of China herself. We oppose therefore any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan: We also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents are bound to acquire political significance. Undertakings of such nature, if carried through to the end, must give rise to complications that might eventually necessitate discussion of problems like fixing spheres of influence or even international control or division of China, which would be the greatest possible misfortune for China and at the same time would have the most serious repercussion upon Japan and East Asia. Japan therefore must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade, as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia.

"However, supplying China with war planes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisers to China or contracting a loan to provide funds for political uses, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and to disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

"The foregoing attitude of Japan should be clear from the policies she has pursued in the past. But, on account of the fact that positive movements for joint action in China by foreign powers under one pretext or another are reported to be on foot, it is deemed not inappropriate to reiterate her policy at this time." (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States - Japan: 1931 - 1941, Volume 1, pp.224-225.)